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Alterity and Otherness have often been the privileged field of 
contemplation within Western philosophy. Since the Presocratic philosophers, 
Being has been defined in relation to – and more often opposed to – non-Being, 
just as Goodness has been considered in relation to Evil, Beauty in relation to the 
Ugly, Society in relation to Nature, and the examples could be multiplied ad 
libitum. Every identity is shaped in opposition to an excluded other,  an outside, 
or some thing. Identity and alterity are thus constructed as two inseparable sides 
of a single, coherent philosophical discourse, or rather a field of various 
discourses that comprise a philosophy, associated with - although not limited to - 
the early centuries of what we call modernity. 
 
Alterity has many faces, depending not only on the different fields of 
thought in which it is explored (e.g., theology, anthropology, aesthetics, politics, 
etc.), but also on the nature of its relationship with identity and, more 
particularly, with the degree of its resistance to or compatibility with identity. No 
wonder, thus, that so many philosophers have been fascinated not only with 
alterity in general, but with alterity at the extreme boundaries (geographical as 
much as ontological) of otherness, at its greatest distance from identity itself. 
The otherness found at this extreme distance has traditionally been described as 
monstrous. 
 
Monstrosity and the monster have received an astonishing degree of 
attention across the centuries, not only from philosophers, artists and poets but 
also, more recently, from scholars in the history of philosophy. The concept of 
marginality and margins, in particular, has magnetized the attention of the latter 
and, in the process, completely expanded the comprehension of the centre, or  
what is considered the centre. Perhaps what has not been underlined enough in 
the history of philosophy is something best described by an almost paradoxical 
expression:  the centrality of the margin itself. Monstrosity does not simply offer 
the line or the margin as the site of conflict, difference, or what remains unknown 
(for example, between the inside and the outside of identity); it entails a 
reflection upon the role played by alterity and otherness in the grounding or 
emergence of identity. In other words, it draws our attention to the role played 
by marginality, and otherness of various kinds, in the definition, conception, and 
understanding of identity during the early modern period and beyond. In our 
view, identity itself is inseparable from monstrosity. 
 
 
If the monstrum is what causes the most profound bewilderment and 
amazement and if, according to Aristotle’s dictum about thaumazein in the incipit 
of his Metaphysics, wonder is the origin of philosophy itself,i might we recognize 
in monstrosity and its marginality something more archetypical and central than 
has traditionally been credited? Perhaps we might find in abnormality, 
exceptionality, and otherness something  that amazes and, more disturbingly, 
interpellates the entire philosophical enterprise. Thus, the opening of 
philosophy, that is, the openings of worlds, the genesis of forms of life, are each 
tied, as if in a web, with the many figures of monstrosity.  
 
* * * 
 
Given the multifarious complexity of the topic of monstrosity, a plurality of 
approaches and singular incursions into the thought of individual philosophers 
or of limited historical periods often provides the best results. This is the 
rationale and the approach that we have followed for this special issue. We have 
asked contributors for monographic articles on monstrosity in single authors or  
articles that compare philosophers’ use of monstrosity; we also asked 
contributors to measure the impact that early modern ideas of monstrosity have 
had, or continue to have, upon contemporary philosophical and political issues. 
 
The question of cultural impact is particularly relevant. Among the 
philosophical ideas that have had an influence on the world we live in, 
monstrosity – in the broadest sense of profound alterity and radical otherness – 
is one of the most powerful. Our hypothesis is that this impact relates to the 
active resistance consistently opposed by the concept of monstrosity to its own 
place and definition. The monster has been considered as an object of study--
observed, defined, and classified, always in relation and subordination to the 
norm. And yet – and this is what we see in the early modern philosophical 
anxiety vis-à-vis monstrosity – the concept of monstrosity has always resisted 
capture and escaped an imposed definition. The idea of monstrosity has 
continuously refused domestication, and most vitally, often succeeded in 
imposing an autonomous and independent self-affirmation, beyond and against 
the power of the norm. This has happened from the beginning of Western 
philosophy, for example in the sense that the simulacrum, in Plato, reaches an 
autonomous ontological status and simultaneously threatens both the idea and 
the copy, as Gilles Deleuze points out in a remarkable piece.ii 
 
It is precisely with Plato that our enquiry begins, with Georgios Tsagdis’s 
article and the concept of thêrion. Whereas Aristotle distinguishes carefully 
between the natural and the political domains when he deals with the category 
of monstrosity,iii in Plato, the teratological dimension pervades both domains. 
Tsagdis does not focus solely on the teras, but considers also the thêrion, which 
in Plato’s thought resides half-way between the animal and the monstrous. 
Beyond a purely metaphorical reading, Plato responds to the problem, at once 
political, physical, and psychological, of the multifarious beast; he develops what 
Tsagdis calls, with a Platonic neologism, a theriopolitics. 
 
Tsagdis’s reconstruction offers a thoughtful basis for a group of articles 
devoted to some of the most important philosophers of the 17th century. Andrea 
Bardin frames Hobbes’s philosophy between Galileo and Descartes, insisting on 
the intertwining of the natural and political dimensions of the problem of 
monstrosity. Bardin’s enquiry reveals the ideological dimensions of Descartes’s 
and Hobbes’s scientific enterprise. Beyond the too easy opposition between 
dualism and monism, the two philosophers reinterpret materialism as a threat to 
their project of characterising modernity, both on psychological grounds (i.e., the 
invention of the modern subject) and political ones (i.e., the invention of modern 
sovereignty). 
Hobbes is also at the centre of Arnaud Milanese’s article, which analyses 
the dual dimensions of monstrosity in Hobbes’ writings, namely the Civil War in 
Behemoth and the absolute sovereignty in Leviathan. Nothing, however, seems to 
support a clear and unambiguous opposition between the two models. Nothing, 
in other words, supports the idea that an extreme violence is confined to a 
natural sphere preceding political civilisation, as many contemporary readings 
suggest. Through the study of monstrosity and its relationship to animality, 
Milanese invites us to reconsider influential readings, such as Freud’s and 
Derrida’s, and to restore to Hobbes’s thought the full magnitude of its complexity 
and productive ambivalence. 
 
Oliver Feltham and Susan Ruddick explore another major author of the 
17th century, namely Baruch Spinoza, whose philosophy itself has been 
described as monstrous from its inception; a characterization that continues 
across the modern period.iv While Feltham focuses on the monstrous nature of 
the multitude, developed in different ways by both Hobbes and Spinoza, Ruddick 
scrutinises the potentialities of Spinoza’s monstrous philosophy to decenter and 
de-ontologise the human subject, and invites us to reflect upon the limits of the 
human/nature boundary itself. Fruitfully employing Spinozism in order to build 
an original theory of judgement (Feltham) and an original critique of 
anthropocentrism and capitalist technocracy (Ruddick), both articles offer a 
deep analysis of the intimate connection between history and theory. In this way, 
they also open up a number of dialogues between monstrosity and 
contemporary discussions around ‘new materialism’ and the shape of the 
posthuman. 
  
The passage from the 17th to the 18th century brought a new role and 
status for the concept of monstrosity. This largely happened within the 
development of the post-Cartesian critique de système by many 18th century 
philosophers, a development that allows some to elaborate new ideas regarding 
the origins of life as well as the new place of man in both civil society and, more  
broadly, in nature. This is manifest most clearly in the neo-Spinozist Denis 
Diderot and the crypto-Spinozist Giacomo Leopardi, two of the most important 
intellectual figures of the 18th century. 
 
In her article, Annie Ibrahim takes up the interconnections between 
physiology and politics in Diderot’s work, looking particularly at the concepts of 
normality, hybridity, and monstrosity. As with Ruddick’s reflections on the need 
to compose human and non-human hybrids with Spinoza, Ibrahim also explores 
the posthuman monstrous forms emerging in Diderot’s Philosophical Thoughts.   
Holding a revolutionary position against the idea of fixed and rigid boundaries, 
Diderot has much to say about the archaeology of biotechnology and biopolitics. 
Through the critique of a rigid taxonomy dividing the species, Ibrahim claims, 
Diderot’s thought functions as an antidote to any possible taxonomy within the 
human species itself. Rather, his quest is to invent a physiology of the living 
monstrous, and Ibrahim reflects upon the political stakes of such a position. 
  
The relative nature of the concept of monstrosity can also be seen in Fabio 
Frosini’s analysis of Leopardi’s thought. Leopardi develops his powerful 
meditation on monstrosity in nature within the dialectic between its reality and 
its imagination. Monstrosity, Frosini claims, is thus linked with the inception of 
the peculiarly human perception of the exceptionality of man or, in other words, 
of humanity as something distinguished from nature. Deviation from nature and 
otherness thus distinguish man from nature, making monstrosity, in Frosini’s 
words, “the identification mark of humanity.” 
 
The last section of our issue continues the analysis on more contemporary 
ground, exploring the ramifications of ancient and early modern conceptions of 
monstrosity in recent philosophy and politics. Vittorio Morfino traces the 
presence of monstrosity in two major 20th century French philosophers, Henri 
Bergson and George Canguilhem, back to the Latin poet Lucretius. The 
connection with Spinozism is thus made clear once again, as the ancient atomists 
are one of the few classical sources explicitly praised by the author of the Ethics.v 
The interest in revisiting Bergson and Canguilhem is not only exegetical, but 
instead philosophico-political since what is at stake is nothing less than the 
status of chance, contingency, necessity, and the ontological determination of 
nature and the world. Through these divergent interpretations of Lucretius, 
Morfino explores the problem of man’s role and the possibilities to shape both 
the world and nature, despite the tyranny of forms. Morfino’s article points to 
the figure of monstrum as an inevitable materialist process of grappling with the 
aleatory, the uncertain and the unknown. 
  
Echoing authors such as Foucault, Butler, and Mbembe, Selin Islekel and 
Andrea Torrano each tackle the issue of monstrosity in light of one of the most 
explored concepts in contemporary political philosophy, that of biopolitics, 
where the production of life and its others are both ordered and contained. 
Between the disciplinary and the biopolitical paradigms, Islekel argues, modern 
societies organize their populations and establish their destinies of death not so 
much through an external and negative force, but rather through an internal 
functional power that Islekel characterises as “Ubu-esque.” Torrano also 
challenges the idea of a negative and external bio-power acting from the outside 
on and against a positively self-established political body. She reads monstrosity 
through the category of immunization, namely through an internally produced 
antidote or poison that acts upon and through that same political body. 
Returning to the Hobbesian paradigm once again, but now stretching the 
analysis to consider the contemporary positions of Negri, Agamben, and 
Esposito, Torrano interrogates emergent forms of monstrous subjectivity and 
clearly illustrates the early modern roots of contemporary political thought. 
 
Even more openly philosophical and political at the same time is the last 
piece in the issue. A. Kiarina Kordela’s reading of monstrosity considers the field 
of contemporary terror(ism). Like Islekel and Torrano, Kordela understands 
Western conceptions of otherness  as constructed not so much as something 
external, a threat from the outside, but rather in a monstrous self-production of a 
new ‘monistic universal’ as the guiding principle of modern capitalism. Moving 
freely between philosophy and psychoanalysis, Kordela reveals what is hidden 
beneath contemporary rhetoric about the monstrosity of terrorism, namely the 
common root of biopower’s identity and otherness. The self and the other are 
today materially embodied in the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the one hand and 
in the suicide bombers on the other. Notwithstanding their claimed opposition, 
the self-defence and the destruction of the other similarly point to the same 
monstrous nature of contemporary biocapitalism. 
 
* * * 
 
Each of the articles in this issue were originally presented at the 
international conference on “The Power of the Monstrous,” held at Brunel 
University, London, on the 26th and 27th of June 2014, and co-organised by the 
Collège International de Philosophie (Paris) and Queen Mary University of 
London. As the title of the conference suggests, the question at stake, for all our 
authors, is monstrosity’s potentia, only improperly translatable in English as 
‘power.’vi Together, the articles help to signpost something about the insuperable 
and inseparable connection between philosophy and monstrosity, and hence 
something about the movement of philosophy today: thinking emerges not 
within a single discursive field but through many openings and mutations into 
politics, aesthetics, culture, science, history. To ask the question of monstrosity’s 
potentia today is to invite reflections upon the figure of monstrosity before its 
categorisation as other, outside, limit or margin. It is to bring the margin to the 
centre. But it is also to ask something about the act of thinking monstrosity 
today. What is a monstrous philosophy? 
 
In his Art poétique, one of the most influential works on 17th century 
aesthetics, Nicolas Boileau wrote that there is no monster that cannot be made 
beautiful by art.vii What a magnificent attempt to neutralise the concept of 
monstrosity, in the ultimate attempt to connect beauty, reason, and truth and tie 
them together against their Baroque otherness! And yet monstrosity, untamed 
through the centuries, resists; through the powerful and productive ambivalence 
that has challenged us since the early days of our civilisation, monstrosity 
persists. A spectre is still haunting Western philosophy: the spectre of 
monstrosity. 
 
Filippo Del Lucchese (Brunel University, London. Senior Research 
Associate, University of Johannesburg) 
Caroline Williams (Queen Mary University of London). 
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